This paper examines the perceived ethical values of Malaysian managers. It is based on the opinions of 15 hypothetical ethical/unethical business situations from the 81 managers who agreed to participate in the survey. The findings of this study showed that these Malaysian managers have high ethical values. However 53% of the respondents believed that the ethical standards of today are lower than that of 15 years ago. Apparently, this is related to the existence of many unethical business practices prevalent in (...) the modern business world. The behavior of one's immediate superior is the most important factor in influencing managers to commit unethical practices. The results also indicate only a slight variation among the managers in terms of perceived ethical values by virtue of job position, job specialization, type of business activity or the size of the business organization. (shrink)

Frankfurt Okulu felsefe ve sosyolojinin arasında yer alan bir düşünce hareketini oluşturur. Hareketin en tanınmış üyeleri Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer ve Herbert Marcus’tur. Adorno gibi diğerlerinin de düşünceleri Aydınlanma eleştirisi, estetik, kültür teorisi ve genel olarak çağdaş toplumun değerlendirilmesi gibi oldukça geniş bir alana yayılmaktadır. Karl Marx ve Sigmund Freud Frankfurt Okulu düşünürlerinin düşüncelerinin şekillenmesindeki en önemli iki figürü oluşturmaktadır. Adorno ve Teoloji adlı bu eser, Adorno’nun eserlerinden hareketle teoloji, metafizik ve genel olarak din konusuna taalluk eden konuları ele (...) alıp incelemektedir. (shrink)

I argue against a standard conception of classification, according to which concepts classify by drawing boundaries. This conception cannot properly account for "higher-order vagueness." I discuss in detail claims by Crispin Wright about "definitely," and its connection with higher-order vagueness. Contrary to Wright, I argue that the line between definite cases of red and borderline ones is not sharp. I suggest a new conception of classification: many concepts classify without drawing boundaries; they are boundaryless. Within this picture, there are no (...) orders of vagueness, though the phenomena which suggest the description "higher-order vagueness" are real enough. (shrink)

Academic ethical values, having the well-deserved place by nursing and other scientific fields, and developing of the nursing science are proportionate to obeying the academic ethical values and internalizing those values. This study was carried out to determine the nurse academicians’ attitudes related to ethical values and related factors. The descriptive research was carried out between the dates of May and June 2017. The scope of the research consisted of nurse academicians working for two universities in Turkey and the sample (...) of the study consisted of 103 nurse academicians who had accepted to participate in the research. Data were collected by using “Descriptive Characteristics Information Form” and “Academic Ethics Values Scale”. Ethical considerations: Ethic approval from the institution, the Training and Research Hospital Noninvasive Clinical Studies Ethics Committee at the University of İzmir Katip Çelebi, and written approval from the owner of the scale were taken in order to carry out the study. The average age of the participants was 35.7 ± 9.6, 95% of them were female, and 51.5% of them were working as research assistants. The nurse academicians’ total item point average was 177,99 ± 11,01 and the attitudes of nurse academicians towards academic ethical values were positively. When the sub-dimension item point averages of the scale were examined, the lowest item point average was determined for the sub-dimension of “Scientific Research” as the highest item point average were being determined for the sub-dimension of “Teaching Process”. In this study that the participants’ attitudes towards academic ethical values were found meaningful at a high level, it was seen that academic assignment and age were important factors for the nurse academicians’ attitudes towards the colleagues and the teaching process. (shrink)

Plato can claim a preeminent place in the philosophy of education, for two reasons at least. The first is that he started the subject; the second is that he expressed with a force which has not since been surpassed a particular, seemingly authoritarian, view about it. Any liberal has to come to grips with this view, for which ‘Platonism’ is still the most appropriate name; and the first step is to determine more exactly what, in essence, the view is. This (...) paper will not be concerned with the close examination of Plato’s text; that must be left for a book about his moral philosophy that I am working on. I shall say nothing about the quaint details of the educational curriculum in the Republic or the Laws, which have distracted the attention of some commentators from more fundamental problems. What I aim to discuss is the question ‘Can virtue be taught?’, with which Plato introduces the subject in the Meno—the question which more than any other provides the incentive for his entire philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

Having discussed prescriptive language in Part I, Hare turns to value‐words in Parts II and III. He begins by arguing that though value‐words are ‘supervenient’ or ‘consequential’, they are so not as a matter of analytic entailment, e.g. because ‘good’ means ‘most conducive to pleasure’. Hare's argument for thus rebutting all forms of naturalism is that any definition of ‘good’ in this way would prevent us from commending something we want to commend.

Hare explains what he means by ‘Ethical Theory’, and what he means by ‘Taxonomy’. Ethical theory, which Hare contrasts to ‘moral theory’, is a purely formal discipline that is concerned with the meaning and logical properties of moral words. Hare offers a ‘Taxonomy’ of ethical theories in the sense of a classification into genera and differentia, beginning with what he sees as the basic dichotomy in ethical theory between descriptivism and non‐descriptivism. The difference between descriptivist and non‐descriptivist ethical theories is (...) that, according to the former, the meaning of moral statements is determined entirely by their truth conditions; the latter deny that this is so. Hare divides descriptivism into ‘Naturalism’ and ‘Intuitionism’, and non‐descriptivism into ‘Emotivism’ and ‘Rationalism’. (shrink)

This is a translation of the text as it is found in Migne’s Patrologia Latina, and Stump helpfully includes the column numbers of that edition in her English version of it. She did check the 1570 Glareanus edition and notes some discrepancies between it and the Patrologia text, but her chief concern was to translate, not to edit, in order that a remarkable work might be put into the hands of those for whom Latin is an impediment. The interest of (...) this book is far from being confined to neophytes, however; indeed, for many the principal attraction of the book will lie in Stump’s notes and in her essays which make up part 2. The actual translation takes up only sixty-six pages, so there is a great deal here for the reader to savor, over and above what, on the basis of a few comparisons, I judge to be a faithful and accurate translation. as "offense against the sovereignty of the people or that of extortion by a provincial governor, fall under the judicial genus" does seem a trifle anachronistic. But then one finds "Watergate" in the index.). (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

[R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...) no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials. /// [David Wiggins] Evans was not wrong (I maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play, is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred. (shrink)

It is my intention in this paper to highlight the dangers which arise when people appeal to moral intuitions to settle questions in political, and in general in applied, philosophy. But first I want to ask why all or nearly all of us are in favour both of liberty and of equality – why all our intuitions are on their side. In the case of liberty it is easy to understand why. Although philosophers have held diverse theories about the concept (...) of liberty – theories which have been drawn together into two main groups in a famous lecture by Sir Isaiah Berlin – there cannot be much doubt that in the mind of the ordinary man to have liberty is to be under no constraint in doing what one wants to do. This, at any rate, is a main constituent of the concept of liberty as all of us understand it. Since, therefore, it seems self-evidently true that we want to be able to do what we want, we are bound to want liberty and, in general, to be in favour of it. We want it for ourselves; if we universalize our prescriptions, this constrains us to be in favour of it for others as well. That explains why, if any politician can claim that he is fighting for liberty, he is likely to win a large following. In the case of equality the matter is not so clear cut. (shrink)

Are fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes real? What can fiction tell us about the nature of truth and reality? In this excellent introduction to the problem of fictionalism R. M. Sainsbury covers the following key topics: what is fiction? realism about fictional objects, including the arguments that fictional objects are real but non-existent; real but non-factual; real but non-concrete the relationship between fictional characters and non-actual worlds fictional entities as abstract artefacts fiction and intentionality and the problem of irrealism (...) fictionalism about possible worlds moral fictionalism. R. M. Sainsbury makes extensive use of examples from fiction, such as Sherlock Holmes, Anna Karenina and Madame Bovary and examines the work of philosophers who have made significant contributions to the topic, including Meinong, David Lewis, and Bas Van Fraassen. Additional features include chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary of technical terms, making _Fiction and Fictionalism_ ideal for those coming to the issue for the first time. (shrink)

I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life's ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all (...) those other philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms have been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. True, their skeletons, indigestible to worms, remained, and were surprisingly similar to one another. But I was led to think again about what one can, and what one cannot, achieve in this direction. (shrink)

Following an introductory classification of prescriptive language that emphasizes the parallel between imperatives and moral language, this chapter distinguishes between the indicative and imperative moods of language. It then dismisses various attempts to account for imperatives, particularly their reduction to indicatives as well as expressivist theories like Ayer's and Stevenson's.

Background: Moral case deliberation is increasingly becoming part of various Dutch healthcare organizations. Although some evaluation studies of moral case deliberation have been carried out, research into the results of moral case deliberation within aged care is scarce. Research questions: How did participants evaluate moral case deliberation? What has moral case deliberation brought to them? What has moral case deliberation contributed to care practice? Should moral case deliberation be further implemented and, if so, how? Research design: Quantitative analysis of a (...) questionnaire study among participants of moral case deliberation, both caregivers and team leaders. Qualitative analysis of written answers to open questions, interview study and focus group meetings among caregivers and team leaders. Participants and research context: Caregivers and team leaders in a large organization for aged care in the Netherlands. A total of 61 moral case deliberation sessions, carried out on 16 care locations belonging to the organization, were evaluated and perceived results were assessed. Ethical considerations: Participants gave informed consent and anonymity was guaranteed. In the Netherlands, the law does not prescribe independent ethical review by an Institutional Review Board for this kind of research among healthcare professionals. Findings: Moral case deliberation was evaluated positively by the participants. Content and atmosphere of moral case deliberation received high scores, while organizational issues regarding the moral case deliberation sessions scored lower and merit further attention. Respondents indicated that moral case deliberation has the potential to contribute to care practice as relationships among team members improve, more openness is experienced and more understanding for different perspectives is fostered. If moral case deliberation is to be successfully implemented, top-down approaches should go hand in hand with bottom-up approaches. Conclusion: The relevance of moral case deliberation for care practice received wide acknowledgement from the respondents. It can contribute to the team’s cohesion as mutual understanding for one another’s views is fostered. If implemented well, moral case deliberation has the potential to improve care, according to the respondents. (shrink)

Through consideration of another practical case, this chapter opens the way to a generalization of the method of argument outlined previously. Multilateral cases raise the question of how the interests of all parties can be resolved into a determinate moral conclusion, which brings the discussion to a standpoint that has affinities with classical utilitarianism. Like the principle of universalizability, the form of the utilitarian principle espoused is purely logical. In both cases, the moral substance comes from fleshing out the parties’ (...) actual inclinations and interests. The chapter embarks on a short survey of the challenges faced by a utilitarian system of this kind, before considering the concept of happiness, act‐utilitarianism, and rule‐utilitarianism. (shrink)

In Russell's Problems of Philosophy (PP), acquaintance is the basis of thought and also the basis of empirical knowledge. Thought is based on acquaintance, in that a thinker has to be acquainted with the basic constituents of his thoughts. Empirical knowledge is based on acquaintance, in that acquaintance is involved in perception, and perception is the ultimate source of all empirical knowledge.

ARISTOTLE'S PROGRAM Aristotle says outright that the law of non-contradiction cannot be demonstrated: you can't prove everything, and among the things you ...

This is a first summary of the author's writing and publishing on the topic of fearism--and, Desh Subba's optimistic "philosophy of fearism.".